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This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay draws on 
psychology theories to propose a framework for incorporating personality variables 
into the study of performance control systems. The second essay reports an 
experiment to highlight the implications of one component of this framework: the 
efficacy of exogenously assigned performance control systems can depend on the 
personality types of employees who are subject to these systems.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
One of the most important topics in managerial accounting research is how 
performance measurement, monitoring, evaluation and reward systems (hereafter, 
performance control systems) affect employee motivation and behavior in 
organizations (Sprinkle and Williamson 2007; Prendergast 1999). Despite the 
voluminous literature on the behavioral effects of performance control systems, 
little research effort is devoted to understanding how personality types affect the 
design and efficacy of these systems. This paucity of research can find its root in 
the belief that human behaviors are primarily a function of the situations in which 
they occur. Although many accounting researchers still hold this belief, 
psychologists now advocate the premise that personality and situational variables 
interact in dynamic ways to affect human behaviors (e.g., Fleeson 2001; Shoda, 
Mischel and Wright 1994). 
This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, I summarize the 
progress made in psychology on how personality types and situational variables 
interact to affect human behaviors. Based on this progress, I propose a framework 
for incorporating personality variables into the study of performance control 
systems. In the second essay, I use an experiment to highlight the implications of 
one component of this framework: the efficacy of exogenously assigned 
performance control systems can depend on the personality types of employees who 
are subject to these systems. 
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Over the years, much theoretical and empirical work in psychology has 
contributed to a better understanding of the specific mechanisms through which 
situational and personality variables interact to affect human behaviors. Earlier 
attempts to understand person-situation interactions model behavior as a function 
of the person, the situation, and a person-situation interaction term using Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA). These studies reveal that the effect of a situation can 
depend on the person who is in it, and the effect of a person can depend on the 
situation the person is in. Buss (1987) draws on prior research and describes three 
additional mechanisms through which personality and situational variables interact: 
selection, evocation and manipulation. More specifically, selection refers to the 
idea that people are not randomly assigned to situations. Instead, they intentionally 
seek and avoid situations. Furthermore, individuals do not have to accept 
environments as selected or given, they frequently change their situations 
unintentionally through evocation or intentionally through manipulation.  
Based on these mechanisms, I propose a framework for incorporating 
personality variables into the study of performance control systems. First, 
consistent with the idea of selection, employees can select the type of performance 
control systems they subject themselves to. As a result, these systems can affect 
employee behavior indirectly by attracting employee types who are predisposed to 
behaviors that are either desirable or undesirable in an organization. Second, even 
when a performance control system is truly exogenously assigned, the efficacy of 
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the system can depend on the personality types of employees who are subject to 
this system. Finally, in environments where managers have discretion over the 
design and implementation of performance control systems, their personality types 
and the personality types of their employees can affect how they design and 
implement these systems through evocation and manipulation. 
I then use an experiment to highlight the implications of one component of 
this framework: the efficacy of performance control systems can depend on the 
personality types of employees who are subject to these systems. In this experiment, 
I examine the effects of a widely adopted performance control system - programs 
that offer employees nonpecuniary recognition based on measures of relative 
performance. Overall, I find that these programs increase both employees’ 
productive efforts (efforts intended to increase one’s own performance) and 
counterproductive efforts (efforts intended to decrease peer performance). 
However, an important personality type, the Dark Triad of personalities, moderates 
these effects. Interestingly, these programs primarily lead individuals high on the 
Dark Triad to increase productive efforts and those low on the Dark Triad to 
increase counterproductive efforts.  
The results of my experiment highlight the importance of considering 
employee personality types when designing and implementing performance control 
systems. These results provide a clear example of how a performance control 
system that motivates productivity in some employees can at the same time induce 
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detrimental behaviors in others. Here, managerial accounting researchers can 
leverage theories developed in personality psychology and provide important 
insights. More specifically, managerial accounting researchers can identify 
important individual characteristics that interact with key elements of performance 
control systems in affecting employee motivation and behaviors. 
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
framework for incorporating personality variables into the study of performance 
control systems. Chapter 3 reports the experiment that highlights the implications 
of one of the framework’s components.  
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Chapter 2: An Interactional Approach to the Study of 
Performance Control Systems 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important topics in managerial accounting research is how 
performance control systems affect employee motivation and behavior in 
organizations (Sprinkle and Williamson 2007; Prendergast 1999). Prior research 
has studied extensively how performance control systems interact with task and 
environmental variables to affect employee performance, and how various 
environmental variables affect the design and implementation of these systems.1 
These studies have provided important insights into our understanding of the use 
of various performance control systems in practice.  
Despite the voluminous literature on the behavioral effects of performance 
control systems, little research effort is devoted to understanding how personality 
types affect the design and efficacy of these systems. On one hand, the lack of 
research in this area is surprising as performance control systems are means to 
affect employee behavior. It’s unlikely that we can gain a comprehensive 
understanding of these systems without considering the characteristics of the 
managers who put these systems in place and those of the employees whose 
behaviors are the target of these systems.  
                                                 
1 For example, see a review of these studies in Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) and Bol (2008).   
  
 6 
 On the other hand, the lack of research attention to personality types is not 
surprising given the belief held by many accounting researchers that human 
behaviors are primarily a function of the situations in which they occur. This belief 
gained popularity after social psychologist Walter Mischel published his influential 
book, Personality and Assessment, in 1968. He wrote: 
Although it is evident that persons are the source from which human 
responses are evoked, it is situational stimuli that evoke them, and it is 
changes in conditions that alter them. Since the assumption of massive 
behavioral similarity across diverse situations no longer is tenable, it 
becomes essential to study the difference in the behaviors of given person 
as a function of the conditions in which they occur.  
 
However, over the years, personality psychologists have provided effective 
rebuttals to Mischel’s argument. More importantly, both personality and social 
psychologists have now come to accept and advocate the premise that personality 
and situational variables interact in dynamic ways to affect human behavior (e.g., 
Fleeson 2001; Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994). 
Thus, I have two primary objectives for this chapter. First, tremendous 
progress has been made in psychology on how personality types and situational 
variables interact to affect human behavior. I summarize this progress and introduce 
it to the accounting literature. Second, based on this summary, I propose a 
framework for incorporating personality types into the study of performance 
control systems. 
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Personality types refer to enduring individual differences in thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors (McCrae and Costa 1996). A large literature in personality 
psychology demonstrates that these differences are stable over time (e.g., Costa and 
McCrae 1980, 1988; Headey and Wearing 1989; Roberts and DelVecchio 2000).  
Prior to 1960’s, personality psychologists’ examination of the effect of personality 
variables on human behavior existed harmoniously but separated from social 
psychologists’ investigation of the effect of situational variables on human 
behavior.  In 1968, Walter Mischel published an influential book that disrupted this 
peaceful coexistence (Michel 1968).  
Mischel (1968) argues that behaviors are too inconsistent across situations 
for personality to have a meaningful impact. In support of this argument, he 
reported the results of a meta-analysis that suggest that the correlations between 
personality and behavior or behavior across situations rarely exceeded the 0.3-0.4 
range. These correlations suggest that less than 15% of the variance in behavior can 
be accounted for by personality. His book caused many social psychologists to 
believe that personality traits are of extremely limited value for predicting human 
behavior, and it even led many to question the mere existence of personality. 
Over the years, advancement in personality psychology provides effective 
rebuttals to Mischel’s argument. First, Funder and Ozer (1983) point out that the 
effects of personality variables cannot be compared to the effects of situational 
variables without a common metric. Social psychologists traditionally use F 
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statistics from ANOVAs to demonstrate the effects of manipulated situational 
variables. Personality psychologists, on the other hand, traditionally use 
correlations between personality scales and behaviors to document the effects of 
personality variables. The statistics used by social psychologists and personality 
psychologists are not comparable at face value. However, Funder and Ozer (1983) 
find that after converting effect sizes into correlations, the correlations between 
situational variables and behaviors average less than 0.40 in several of the most 
famous experiments in social psychology (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; 
Darley and Batson 1973; Milgram 1975).  
For example, in a series of arguably the most famous experiments in the 
history of social psychology, Milgram (1975) identifies two important 
environmental variables that influence a subject’s willingness to obey commands 
from an authority figure to harm an innocent victim: (1) the physical proximity of 
the victim to the subject, and (2) the physical proximity of the commanding 
authority to the subject. Funder and Ozer (1983) find that the correlations between 
these two variables and obedience are 0.42 and 0.36, respectively. These effects are 
no bigger than those of important personality variables.  
Second, researchers argue that correlations in the range of 0.3-0.4 are not 
small if personality types can predict important life outcomes. For example, based 
on a review of over 50 studies, Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Capsi, Goldberg (2007) 
conclude that the effects of personality traits on important life outcomes such as 
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mortality, divorce and occupational attainment, are indistinguishable from the 
effects of socioeconomic status and cognitive ability. In many cases, personality 
traits even predict these important outcomes better than socioeconomic status.  
Third, personality psychologists have made tremendous progress on 
understanding the origin of personality traits. Studies using twins reared together 
and twins separated at infancy and reared apart as subjects consistently find that 
regardless of the personality traits studied, the correlations of these personality 
traits between identical twins are much higher than those of fraternal twins (e.g., 
Nichols 1978; Goldsmith 1983; Tellegen, Lykken, Bouchard, Wilcox, Segal, and 
Rich 1988;  Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, and Tellegen 1990). Results from 
these studies provide convincing evidence that genetics plays an important role in 
the formation of personality traits. In fact, these studies estimate that about 50% of 
the variance in personality traits can be accounted for by genetic differences as 
compared to 70% of the variance in IQ.  
 Finally and most related to my objective for this chapter, researchers from 
both paradigms (i.e. personality psychology and social psychology) now agree that 
it is useless to argue about whether personality or situational variables govern 
human behavior because these variables interact in dynamic ways to affect human 
behavior (e.g., Fleeson 2001; Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994). Consequently, 
much theoretical and empirical work attempt to shed light on the specific 
mechanisms through which personality and situational variables interact.  
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Earlier attempts to understand person-situation interactions model behavior 
as a function of the person, the situation, and a person-situation interaction term 
using ANOVA. This type of person-situation interaction is often referred to as 
statistical or mechanistic interaction (e.g. Emmons et al. 1986). Statistical 
interaction implies that the effect of a situation can depend on the person who is in 
it, and the effect of a person can depend on the situation the person is in. Buss 
(1987) draws on prior research and describes three additional mechanisms through 
which personality and situational variables interact: selection, evocation and 
manipulation. More specifically, selection refers to the idea that people are not 
randomly assigned to situations. Instead, they intentionally seek and avoid 
situations. Furthermore, individuals do not have to accept environments as selected 
or given, they frequently change their situations unintentionally through evocation 
or intentionally through manipulation.  
Based on these mechanisms, I propose a framework for incorporating 
personality variables into the study of performance control systems. First, 
consistent with the idea of selection, employees can select the type of performance 
control systems they subject themselves to. As a result, these systems can affect 
employee behavior indirectly by attracting employee types who are predisposed to 
certain behaviors that are either desirable or undesirable in an organization. Second, 
even when a performance control system is truly exogenously assigned, consistent 
with the idea of statistical interaction, the efficacy of the system can depend on the 
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personality types of employees who are subject to this system. Finally, in 
environments where managers have discretion over the design and implementation 
of performance control systems, their personality types and the personality types of 
their employees can affect how they design and implement these systems through 
evocation and manipulation. 
Section 2.2 summarizes research in psychology that demonstrates the 
importance of selection, and discusses current research and future research 
opportunities to investigate the selection effects of performance control systems. 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of statistical interaction and discusses the 
implications of statistical interaction for the use of performance control systems in 
practice. Section 2.4 provides an overview of evocation and manipulation and 
explores how these two mechanisms can affect the design and implementation of 
performance control systems. Section 2.5 provides concluding remarks.  
2.2 SELECTION 
 
2.2.1 An Overview of Selection 
 
Research suggests that personality types play a significant role in how 
people select situations. That is, people tend to select situations that are compatible 
with their personality traits, and avoid situations that are incompatible.  As a result, 
selection is one of the most important and interesting mechanisms through which 
personality is expressed (Argyle 1977, page 366). For example, in Emmons, 
Diener, and Larsen (1986), subjects record the situations they encountered over a 
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30-day period, and indicate whether the situation was imposed or chosen. The 
authors find that personality traits predict the pattern of which participants choose 
to spend time in certain situations and avoid other situations. Among other findings, 
individuals high in extraversion, sociability, and need for affiliation spend a larger 
percentage of time in chosen social situations and a smaller percentage of time in 
chosen alone situations. In addition, individuals high in need for achievement and 
endurance spend a larger percentage of time in chosen work situations.    
The effects of personality are not limited to people’s choice of everyday 
situations. Research shows that personality types influence some of the most 
important choices people make in life. For example, personality affects people’s 
choice of mate. A number of studies have found that people tend to be attracted to 
and marry others with similar personality traits (e.g., Buss, 1985; Buss and Barnes 
1986; Klohnen and Luo 2003; Botwin, Buss and Shackelford 2006; Rushton and 
Bons 2006). In addition, similarity in personality indeed predicts greater 
relationship satisfaction (Gonzaga, Campos, and Bradbury 2007; Russell and Wells 
1991). 
Personality types affect people’s choice of where to live. A large literature 
documents that people in different geographic regions differ in personality (see a 
review of this literature in Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008). That is, people with 
similar personality traits tend to cluster geographically. Theory suggests that these 
geographical variations can be explained, at least in part, by the tendency of 
  
 13 
individuals to migrate to geographical locations with residents who share their 
personality traits and institutions (e.g. universities, businesses, cultural centers) that 
support the expression of these traits (Rentfrow et al. 2008). 
Personality types influence people’s choice of occupation. One of the most 
influential theories in this area is Holland’s theory of occupational choice (Osipow 
1990). Holland (1985) argues that people can be classified into six personality types 
that are important for their vocational choice: realistic (doers), investigative 
(thinkers), artistic (creators), social (helpers), enterprising (persuaders), and 
conventional (organizers). Each personality type seeks out and thrives in career 
environments that are congruent with and support the expression of that personality 
type. Research suggests that vocational congruence, the degree to which personality 
types are congruent with career environments, predicts persistence, satisfaction, 
and stability of career choices (Osipow 1990; Assouline and Meir 1987; Tranberg, 
Slane, and Ekeberg 1993).  
2.2.2 Selection and Performance Control Systems 
  
The idea that employees self-select into different performance control 
systems is not new. A large literature provides theoretical and empirical support for 
the premise that performance-based pay attracts individuals with necessary skills 
to achieve high performance on the compensated task (e.g., Chow 1983; Waller and 
Chow 1985; Shields and Waller 1988; Dillard and Fisher 1990; Kachelmeier and 
Williamson 2010; Banker, Lee, Potter, and Srinivasan 2000). While this line of 
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research examines extensively how task-specific skill influences people’s choice of 
performance control systems, there’s a paucity of research investigating the effects 
of personality types on this important choice.  
Prior research suggests that personality plays a significant role in affecting 
motivation and task performance (e.g., Kanfer and Ackerman1989; Robert and 
Locke 2004; O’Connor and Paunonen 2007). In today’s environment where the 
technical skills necessary for jobs in many organizations are constantly changing, 
companies are putting increasing emphasis on attracting personality types with 
dispositions to work effectively at developing creative solutions to challenging 
problems (Stillman 2014). Johanna Frelin, CEO of Hyper Island, summarizes the 
results of an international survey her company conducted as follows: “there is a 
growing desire for talent with unique combination of skill and flexibility – people 
who can collaborate, adapt quickly, and are enjoyable company, but also have the 
drive to get things done. All those traits boil down to a personality that is essential 
for business operating in an ever-changing digital landscape.”  
Hales, Wang and Williamson (2014) use an experiment to demonstrate that 
performance control systems can be designed to attract employees with personality 
characteristics organizations desire. In particular, the authors use an experiment to 
show that stock-based compensation relative to fixed pay attracts employees high 
on dispositional optimism, a personality trait associated with the tendency to expect 
that good things will happen (Scheier and Carver 1985). They also show that one 
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benefit of attracting individuals high on dispositional optimism is that these 
individuals persist longer and are therefore more productive on a challenging task 
where they face uncertainty as to whether their efforts will lead to high productivity.  
  In addition to dispositional optimism, research has identified other 
personality traits that can enhance performance on specific tasks. For example, 
prior research provides consistent evidence that openness, one of the Big Five 
personality traits, is positively correlated with creative performance (e.g., McCrae 
1987; Dollinger, Urban and James 2004; Kachelmeier, Wang and Williamson 
2014).2 To the extent that creativity is an important factor driving a company’s 
competitive advantage in today’s business environment, exploring how 
performance control systems can be designed to facilitate the selection of 
employees high in openness, and therefore, employees with high creative potential 
is a worthwhile endeavor.  
                                                 
2The Big Five personality traits is a widely accepted taxonomy to classify personality traits into five 
non-overlapping domains: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism (McCrae and Costa 1996). John, Naumann and Soto (2008) provide a brief description 
of each domain. Openness describes the “breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an 
individual’s mental and experiential life.” Conscientiousness describes “socially prescribed impulse 
control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior, such as thinking before acting, delaying 
gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks.” 
Extraversion implies “an energetic approach toward the social and material world and includes traits 
such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.” Agreeableness “contrasts a 
prosocial and communal orientation toward others with antagonism and includes traits such as 
altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, and modesty. Finally, neuroticism contrasts “emotional stability 
and even-temperedness with negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and 
tense.”   
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Other personality traits can also be attracted to widely used performance 
control systems such as team performance contract, relative performance contract, 
target-based pay, and subjective performance evaluation. Personality traits attracted 
to these systems may or may not be desirable. Current research primarily focuses 
on the direct performance effect of these systems. Future research can examine the 
personality traits attracted to these widely used performance control systems and 
the performance implications (both positive and negative) of attracting these 
personality traits. 
2.3 STATISTICAL INTERACTION 
 
2.3.1 An Overview of Statistical Interaction 
 
Personality traits are not only expressed in how people select situations, 
they are also expressed in how people respond to exogenously assigned situations.   
A stream of research that models human behavior as a function of the person, the 
situation, and their interaction term demonstrates this point well. When modeling 
behavior taking this approach, variance in behavior is partitioned into three 
categories: variance accounted for by the person, the situation, the statistical 
interaction between the two. Studies taking this approach consistently conclude that 
the interactional component accounts for the greatest proportion of variance (see 
reviews in Bowers 1973, Ekehammar 1974, and Endler and Magnusson 1976).3 
                                                 
3 For example, in a study of dominant behaviors by Dworkin and Kihlstrom (1978), the effect of the 
person, the situation, and the person-situation interaction accounted for about 10%, 8%, and 24%, 
respectively.  
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The results of these studies suggest that people with different personality 
types often respond quite differently to situations that are commonly assigned. For 
example, in a classic study that examines the effect of ambient stimulation on 
cognitive performance, ambient stimulation increases cognitive performance for 
extraverts and decreases cognitive performance for introverts (Eysenck 1981).4  As 
another example, Tepper, Duffy, and Shaw (2001) find that employees high in 
conscientiousness are more likely than those low in conscientiousness to respond 
to abusive supervision with constructive resistance. However, employees low in 
conscientiousness are more likely than those high in conscientiousness to respond 
to abusive supervision with dysfunctional resistance.  
2.3.2 Statistical Interaction and Performance Control Systems 
 
Consistent with the idea of statistical interaction, the efficacy of 
exogenously assigned performance control systems can depend on personality 
types of employees who are subject to these systems. To the extent personality 
types cluster at the industry, firm or team level due to selection, it is important for 
managers to consider the unique characteristics of their workforce in designing and 
implementing performance control systems. There is some albeit limited research 
on statistical interactions between personality types and commonly used 
performance control systems in practice. Brownell (1981) find that locus of control, 
                                                 
4 Extraversion (introversion) is one of the Big Five personality traits.  
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the extent to which individuals feel that they have control over events affecting 
them, moderates the relation between participatory budgeting and participants’ 
performance on a decision-making task. In particular, budgetary participation 
improves task performance for participants with an internal locus of control (i.e., 
those who feel that they have control over their destinies), and it decreases task 
performance for participants with an external locus of control (i.e. those who feel 
that their destinies are controlled by environmental factors).  
Future studies can examine how other personality traits affect the efficacy 
of commonly adopted performance control systems. For example, one extensively 
studied topic in management accounting and other disciplines is the effect of 
assigned goals on task performance. One of the most robust findings from this 
literature is that challenging but achievable (i.e. stretch) goals lead to higher 
performance than easy goals (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Sprinkle and Williamson 
2007). However, whether goals are achievable is a matter of subjective opinion. It 
can be influenced by personality traits such as dispositional optimism. To the extent 
that people low in dispositional optimism tend to think that challenging goals are 
unachievable, they will lose motivation and disengage from the task (Garland 
1984). As a result, in stark contrast to the widely held belief that challenging goals 
enhance motivation and performance, they may be demotivating for individuals 
low on dispositional optimism. Future research can provide empirical support for 
this argument. 
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Another interesting personality variable that can potentially interact with 
the effects of assigned goals and targets is dispositional goal orientation. Dweck 
(1986) suggests that people adopt either a learning or a performance orientation 
toward tasks. Individuals with a learning orientation seek to increase their 
competence. Individuals with a performance orientation seek to perform well on 
the task in order to gain favorable judgment. Webb, Williamson, and Zhang (2013) 
find that although participants assigned to a challenging goal spend more time 
learning (i.e., looking for shortcuts that increase production efficiency), their 
learning is less efficient (i.e., they find fewer shortcuts per unit of time spent 
looking for shortcuts). They attribute this result to the pressure associated with 
meeting a challenging target. Future research can investigate whether individuals 
with a learning orientation respond to challenging goals differently from 
individuals with a performance orientation in terms of their willingness to invest in 
learning and the efficiency with which they learn.  
2.4 EVOCATION AND MANIPULATION 
 
2.4.1 An Overview of Evocation and Manipulation 
 
Finally, individuals do not have to accept situations as selected or given, 
they often can change these situations through evocation or manipulation. Buss 
(1987) defines evocation as “the actions, strategies, reputations, and coercions that 
are consistently and predictably elicited by individuals, or more precisely, by 
relatively enduring features of those individuals.” An important aspect of evocation 
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is that it happens without intention (Buss 1987). That is, people change their 
environment by evoking responses from others without intending to do so. 
Stereotyping based on gender, race, or ethnicity is a salient example of evocation. 
Here, physical attributes associated with certain social categories evoke judgments 
and responses from others without any intention from the person being judged and 
sometimes the person judging (Kihlstrom 2010). For example, a female walking 
into a meeting room full of male participants changes the dynamics of the 
environment without any intention from the female participant. Personality traits 
also initiate evocation. For example, highly active children elicit control behaviors 
from parents intended to reduce noise and intensity (e.g., Bel 1968; Buss 1981), 
and competitive individuals elicit competitive behaviors from others even when 
others are cooperative in nature (e.g., Kelly and Stahelski 1970).  
Manipulation is another mechanism through which people can change their 
environment after an environment has been imposed or chosen. Buss (1987) defines 
manipulation as “the ways in which individuals intentionally alter, change, 
influence, or exploit others.” He argues that from an evolutionary perspective, 
individuals who are successful at manipulating their environments to gain desirable 
responses survive and thrive. As a result, manipulation is an important mechanism 
through which human beings (and other species) interact with both their physical 
and social environments. The effect of one’s personality type on his/her 
manipulation style is a topic investigated in developmental and education 
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psychology. These studies show that parent and teacher personality traits affect 
their parenting and teaching style (e.g. Hunt and Joyce 1967; Mondell and Tyler 
1981).   
2.4.2 Evocation, Manipulation and Performance Control Systems 
 
Both evocation and manipulation can be incorporated into the study of 
performance control systems. In environments where managers have discretion 
over the design and implementation of performance control systems, their 
personality types can directly affect the design and implementation of these systems 
through manipulation. Additionally, employee personality types can evoke 
performance control responses from managers through evocation.  
For example, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that when managers have 
discretion over whether to implement a minimum performance requirement, their 
choice to control can be costly because most employees reduce their efforts to the 
minimally required level in response to the manager’s decision to control. While 
the authors show that managers vary in their decision to control or trust when they 
are given this discretion, the authors stop short of identifying the source of this 
variation. Given that managers in their experiment face the same financial 
incentives and other environmental factors, manager personality types can be a 
potential driver of this variation.  
Psychologists have long recognized that people exhibit persistent 
differences in their social value orientation: some have strong self-regarding 
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preferences (pro-self types), and others have strong other-regarding preferences 
(pro-social types).5 Research also suggests that people with different social value 
orientation differ in their expectation of others. The triangle hypothesis suggests 
that because pro-self individuals tend to provoke pro-self behaviors from others, 
they tend to view others as homogeneously pro-self. In contrast, pro-social 
individuals tend to hold a more heterogeneous view of others. Although they exhibit 
a greater tendency to believe that others are pro-social, they also acknowledge that 
people can be pro-self. As a result, they develop better skills reading signals 
indicating whether other people are pro-social or pro-self (e.g., Kelly and Stahelsk 
1970; Bogaert et al. 2008). 
The triangle hypothesis suggests that pro-self managers would be more 
likely to implement minimum performance requirement irrespective of the social 
value orientation of their employees. In contrast, pro-social managers are more 
likely to respond to the pro-social or pro-self signals from their employees in 
deciding whether to implement formal or trust-based controls. In other words, 
employees’ social value orientation are more likely to evoke appropriate 
performance control responses from pro-social managers than from pro-self 
managers. Results supporting the triangle hypothesis in the performance control 
                                                 
5 See a review of research on social value orientation in Bogaert, Boone and Declerck (2008).  
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context can have important implications for whether and to whom control discretion 
should be given in organizations. 
Manager personality types do not only have the potential to affect how 
closely they control employee performance, their personality types can also affect 
how much they monitor and override employee decisions. For example, Licata, 
Strawser, and Welker (1986) provide experimental evidence that managers with an 
external locus of control override/monitor subordinates’ self-determined 
performance target to a greater extent than managers with an internal locus of 
control. Campbell, Epstein and Martinez-Jerez (2011) find in a field-research 
setting that the “tightness” with which employee decisions are monitored adversely 
affect employees’ willingness to use decision-rights. Consequently, employees 
whose decisions are tightly monitored experience less learning than those whose 
decisions are loosely monitored. Future research can more directly study the effects 
of manager personality types on the design and implementation of decision 
management and control systems, which, in turn, can have a significant impact on 
organizational learning.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, drawing on psychology theories, I first describe several 
mechanisms through which personality types and environmental variables interact 
to affect human behaviors. Based on these mechanisms, I propose a framework for 
incorporating personality variables into the study of performance control systems.  
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First, consistent with the idea of selection, employees can select the type of 
performance control systems they subject themselves to. As a result, these systems 
can affect employee behavior indirectly by attracting employee types who are 
predisposed to certain behaviors that are either desirable or undesirable in an 
organization. Second, even when a performance control system is truly 
exogenously assigned, consistent with the idea of statistical interaction, the efficacy 
of the system can still depend on the personality types of employees who are subject 
to this system. Finally, in environments where managers have discretion over the 
design of and implementation of performance control systems, their personality 
types and the personality types of their employees can affect how they design and 
implement these systems through evocation and manipulation. 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I report an experiment to highlight the 
implications of one component of this framework: the efficacy of exogenously 
assigned performance control systems can depend on the personality types of 
employees who are subject to these systems. In particular, I examine the effects of 
a widely adopted performance control system - programs that offer employees 
nonpecuniary recognition based on measures of relative performance. I provide 
theories and empirical results to show that the efficacy of this particular form of 
performance control system depends on where employees fall on the Dark Triad 
scale.   
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Chapter 3: Recognizing the Best: The Productive and 
Counterproductive Effects of Relative Performance Recognition 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many organizations recognize employees based on measures of relative 
performance (Frey 2007). For example, organizations can recognize outstanding 
performers relative to their peers with private notes or emails, special ceremonies, 
or by publishing their achievements in company newsletters. These recognitions 
are sometimes symbolic and come with minimal or no corresponding financial 
rewards. Proponents of programs that offer employees nonpecuniary recognition 
based on measures of relative performance (hereafter, recognition programs) argue 
that they are a cost efficient yet highly effective way of motivating employees 
(Luthans 2000).  In support of this argument, prior studies in accounting provide 
experimental and field evidence suggesting that relative performance information 
such as that provided by recognition programs increases productive efforts even 
when it is not tied to pecuniary rewards (e.g., Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman 
2008; Tafkov 2013; Gallani, Takehisa, and Krishnan 2013). However, opponents 
argue this benefit comes at a cost. Among other things, recognition programs 
rupture relationships and lead to counterproductive efforts intended to reduce the 
performance of fellow employees (Kohn 1993). In practice, these behaviors can 
range from refusing to offer help to intentionally destroying tools or information 
needed by other employees to complete their task.   
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Motivated by these opposing views, I examine the effects of recognition 
programs in an environment where individuals can engage in both productive and 
counterproductive activities. In such an environment, whether recognition 
programs produce mainly a productive or counterproductive effect can depend on 
important employee characteristics. I investigate this possibility. That is, I examine 
whether individuals with certain characteristics are more likely to respond to 
recognition programs by increasing productive efforts intended to improve their 
own performance and whether others are more likely to respond by increasing 
counterproductive efforts intended to undermine the performance of their peers.  
Research identifying how employee characteristics predictably influence 
employees’ response to recognition programs is important because it highlights the 
need for managerial accountants to consider the unique characteristics of their 
workforce in determining whether to provide these programs. Based on theories 
developed in personality psychology, I identify the Dark Triad of personality traits 
as an important individual characteristic that can interact with recognition programs 
in interesting and counterintuitive ways to influence employees’ productive and 
counterproductive efforts.  Personality traits refer to enduring individual 
differences in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (McCrae and Costa 1996). In 
particular, the Dark Triad of personality traits is a combination of three personality 
traits: Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. All three traits are 
associated with behavioral tendencies characterized by elevated concerns for self-
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advancement and minimal concerns for maintaining positive relationships (Jones 
and Paulhus 2010). These tendencies lead individuals high on the Dark Triad to 
respond to recognition programs in markedly different ways than those low on the 
Dark Triad.  
In particular, I develop theories suggesting that the effect of recognition 
programs on productive efforts is more pronounced for individuals high on the Dark 
Triad than for individuals low on the Dark Triad. Due to their heightened desire for 
self-advancement, individuals high on the Dark Triad are particularly concerned 
about their relative competence. As a result, I predict that those high on the Dark 
Triad value recognition more than those low on the Dark Triad and therefore, are 
relatively more motivated by the chance of receiving recognition to work harder 
and perform better. 
While common intuition may suggest that individuals high on the Dark 
Triad may also be relatively more likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors 
to increase their own chance of receiving recognition, I develop theories that 
suggest the opposite. Specifically, I develop theories suggesting that the effect of 
recognition programs on counterproductive efforts is more pronounced for 
individuals low on the Dark Triad than those high on the Dark Triad.  
Due to their lack of concern for maintaining positive relationships, 
individuals high on the Dark Triad tend to expect relatively high levels of 
counterproductive efforts from others and exert high levels of counterproductive 
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efforts themselves regardless of whether recognition programs are provided. In 
contrast, individuals low on the Dark Triad are relatively more sensitive to 
situational factors such as recognition programs in terms of how much 
counterproductive efforts they expect from others. Recognition programs, by 
putting them in a competitive environment, increase the amount of 
counterproductive efforts they expect from others. Expecting more 
counterproductive efforts from others can lead them to exert more 
counterproductive efforts themselves due to an innate desire to engage in negative 
reciprocity. As a result, I predict that individuals low on the Dark Triad would 
increase their counterproductive efforts more in response to recognition programs 
than those high on the Dark Triad.  
I use an experiment to test these predictions. In my experiment, I assign 
participants to groups of three and ask them to work on a letter-search task 
individually. The task requires participants to count the number of a specific letter 
(the search letter) in a box of letters called a search box. Participants count as many 
search boxes as they can in a ten-minute window and earn one point for each 
correctly counted box. The number of boxes participants correctly count captures 
participants’ productive efforts as the experimental task is designed to be effort 
sensitive. To create a laboratory environment where participants can exert 
counterproductive efforts to undermine the performance of their peers, I allow 
participants to take away (i.e., destroy) between zero and ten points from each of 
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their two group members anonymously. As each participant’s individual 
performance is calculated as the number of boxes he/she correctly counts minus the 
number of points his/her peers take away, the number of points each participant 
takes away from his/her group members captures counterproductive efforts 
intended to reduce peer performance. All participants are paid a piece-rate pay 
based on their individual performance.  
I manipulate the presence or absence of a nonpecuniary recognition 
program. I recognize the group member with the highest individual performance in 
each group in the Recognition condition. No recognition is promised or given in 
the No Recognition condition. I measure participants’ Dark Triad personalities 
using the 12-item Dark Triad personality questionnaire developed and validated by 
Jonason and Webster (2010).  
I find that although recognition programs increase both productive and 
counterproductive efforts in the aggregate, they increase productive efforts 
relatively more for individuals high on the Dark Triad, and increase 
counterproductive efforts relatively more for individuals low on the Dark Triad. In 
fact, in my experiment, participants high on the Dark Triad respond to the 
recognition program by increasing only their productive efforts whereas those low 
on the Dark Triad respond to the recognition program by increasing only their 
counterproductive efforts.  
  
 30 
In addition, results of my supplemental analyses indicate that participants 
high on the Dark Triad enjoy the experimental task more when a recognition 
program is provided. In stark contrast, participants low on the Dark Triad enjoy the 
experimental task less when a recognition program is provided. Together, these 
results suggest that people high and low on the Dark Triad experience the same 
recognition program in markedly different ways. The patterns of their responses to 
recognition programs in terms of productive efforts, counterproductive efforts, and 
task enjoyment consistently suggest that providing recognition programs to a 
workforce high on the Dark Triad are likely to produce positive firm outcomes 
while providing the same programs to a workforce low on the Dark Triad are likely 
to produce negative firm outcomes.  
This study adds to the growing body of research in accounting on the 
performance effects of relative performance information (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; 
Tafkov 2013; Gallani et al. 2013). This body of literature focuses mainly on the 
productivity-enhancing effect of relative performance information. Overall, these 
studies provide evidence suggesting that relative performance information 
motivates performance even when it is not tied to monetary reward.6 My study adds 
to this literature by highlighting that relative performance information also 
motivates counterproductive efforts even when this information is not associated 
                                                 
6 One exception is Hannan, McPhee, Newman, and Tafkov (2013). Hannan et al. (2013) show that 
relative performance information distorts effort allocation among tasks in a multi-task environment.  
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with financial rewards. As a result, whether relative performance information 
produces a net positive or negative outcome depends on whether the productive or 
counterproductive effect dominates. I identify an important employee 
characteristic, the Dark Triad of personalities, that influences the relative 
magnitude of the productive and counterproductive effect. 
The results of my study have important implications for the use of 
recognition programs in practice. Prior studies suggest that entertainment and 
marketing jobs attract people high on the Dark Triad (e.g., Young and Pinsky 2006; 
Mclean and Jones 1992). To the extent that personality traits in general and the 
Dark Triad of personalities in particular cluster at the industry, company or team 
level, my results highlight the need for managerial accountants to consider the 
unique characteristics of their workforce in determining whether to provide 
recognition based on measures of relative performance.  
In the next section, I develop my hypotheses. I describe the experiment in 
Section 2.2, present the results in Section 2.3, and provide concluding remarks in 
Section 2.4. 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.2.1 The Dark Triad of Personalities 
 
I examine whether the effects of programs that award employees 
nonpecuniary recognitions based on measures of relative performance depend on 
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an important employee characteristic, the Dark Triad of personalities.7 I focus on 
the Dark Triad of personalities because its associated behavior tendencies can 
influence how people respond to recognition programs and the predicted patterns 
of responses provide important implications for the use of recognition programs in 
practice.  
The Dark Triad of personalities has attracted increasing research interests 
over the last decade (Jonason and Webster 2010). It includes three conceptually 
distinct, but empirically overlapping personality traits: Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus and Williams 2002). Machiavellianism is 
characterized by strategic manipulation and exploitation of others (Christie and 
Geis 1970); Narcissism is associated with a sense of grandiosity, entitlement, 
dominance, and superiority (Raskin and Hall 1979); Psychopathy is characterized 
by high impulsivity, thrill-seeking and low-empathy and anxiety (Hare 1985; 
Lilienfeld and Andrews 1996). Despite the traits’ separate origins, individuals high 
on these traits exhibit similar interpersonal behavioral tendencies characterized by 
elevated concerns for self-advancement and minimal concerns for maintaining 
positive relationships (Jones and Paulhus 2010). These behavior tendencies can 
                                                 
7 I focus on recognition programs based on measures of relative performance as these programs are 
common in practice (Kohn 1993). However, other forms of recognition programs such as those that 
recognize employees for achieving individual performance goals are also widely used and are 
interesting constructs for future research.  
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lead individuals high on the Dark Triad to respond to recognition programs in 
markedly different ways than those low on the Dark Triad.8 
3.2.2 Recognition Programs and Productive Efforts  
Studies in accounting draw on social comparison theory to predict that 
recognition programs can increase productive efforts even when recognition is not 
tied to monetary rewards (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013; Gallani et al. 
2013).9 Social comparison theory argues that people have an innate desire to 
compare one’s own performance to that of similar others to evaluate their own 
ability (Festinger 1954; Suls and Wheeler 2000). Self-enhancement is one of the 
main motives why people engage in social comparisons (e.g., Gibbons and Bunk 
1999).10 That is, people engage in social comparison to enhance their self-esteem. 
Comparing favorably in ability to others increases one’s self-esteem and produces 
positive affect while comparing unfavorably to others damages one’s self-esteem 
                                                 
8 Other accounting researchers have also recently investigated the influence of the Dark Triad of 
personalities or its components on accounting decisions and task performance (e.g., Murphy 2012; 
Hales, Hobson, and Resuteck 2012; Brown, Rennekamp, Seybert, and Zhu 2013; Dworkis 2013; 
Majors 2014).  
9 Tournament theory examines the incentive effects of compensation contracts based on relative 
performance information (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey 1983, Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz 1983, and Antle and Smith 1986). However, social comparison theory compliments 
tournament theory in suggesting that winning a tournament can provide positive utility even when 
winning is not tied to financial rewards. As a result, prior studies in accounting primarily use social 
comparison theory to make predictions about how relative performance information affects 
individual efforts and task performance.   
10 Theorists have generally identified and accepted three underlying motives of social comparison: 
self-evaluation, self-improvement, and self-enhancement (Wood 1989; Taylor, Wayment, and 
Carillo1995; Gibbons and Buunk 1999). That is, people engage in social comparison to evaluate 
one’s own ability, to improve his/her ability, and to enhance self-esteem.  
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and produces negative affect (Tesser and Campbell 1980; Tesser, Millar, and 
Moore 1988).  
Recognition programs, by awarding recognition based on measures of 
relative performance, make social comparison possible and salient. In this 
environment, receiving recognition provides a positive signal about one’s 
competence relative to others. This signal enhances self-esteem and induces 
positive affect. As a result, when a recognition program is provided, individuals are 
motivated to work hard in order to increase their chance of receiving recognition. 
Consistent with this argument, Tafkov (2013) and Hannan et al. (2008) find that 
relative performance information such as that provided by recognition programs 
motivates individual efforts and  increases task performance under different pay 
schemes that are not tied to relative performance ranking (e.g., fixed or piece-rate 
pay). 
However, the Dark Triad of personalities can moderate the effect of 
recognition programs on productive efforts. Due to their elevated concerns for self-
advancement, individuals high on the Dark Triad are particularly concerned about 
their competence relative to their peers when placed in a competitive environment 
where social comparison is salient (Jonason, Li, and Teicher 2010; Furtner, 
Rauthmann, and Sachse 2011). As a result, they tend to value recognition, a signal 
of relative competence, more than those low on the Dark Triad. Consequently, 
when provided with a recognition program, they are more motivated by the chance 
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of receiving recognition to work harder and perform better than those low on the 
Dark Triad. I test the following hypothesis:  
H1: The effect of recognition programs on productive efforts is 
more pronounced for individuals high on the Dark Triad than 
for individuals low on the Dark Triad.  
 
3.2.3 Recognition Programs and Counterproductive Efforts  
 
The effect of recognition programs on counterproductive efforts can also be 
different for individuals high and low on the Dark Triad. While common intuition 
may suggest that individuals high on the Dark Triad are relatively more likely than 
those low on the Dark Triad to engage in counterproductive behaviors in order to 
increase their own chance of receiving recognition, I develop theories below that 
suggest the opposite.  
In particular, due to their lack of concern for maintaining positive 
relationships, individuals high on the Dark Triad are antagonistic toward others and 
expect others to be antagonistic toward them in most interpersonal situations (e.g., 
Paulhus and Williams 2002; Jones and Figueredo 2012). Consequently, they tend 
to expect high levels of counterproductive efforts from others and exert high levels 
of counterproductive efforts themselves as long as opportunities to undermine each 
other’s performance exist. They take this antagonistic approach regardless of 
whether a recognition program is provided.  
In contrast, individuals low on the Dark Triad are not likely to be 
antagonistic in non-competitive situations. However, recognition programs put 
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them in a competitive environment. Competition makes people suspicious of others 
(e.g., Deutsch 1949, 1973, 1985; Johnson and Johnson 1975; Amir 1976; Dunn and 
Schweitzer 2004). Morton Deutsch, one of the founding fathers of the field of 
conflict resolution, explains the effect of competition as follows:  
In a competitive relationship, one is predisposed to cathect the other 
negatively, to have a suspicious, hostile, exploitative attitude toward the 
other, to be psychologically closed to the other, to be aggressive and 
defensive toward the other, to seek advantage and superiority for self and 
disadvantage and inferiority for the other, to see the other as opposed to 
oneself and basically different, and so on. One is also predisposed to expect 
the other to have the same orientation (Deutsch 1985).  
 
Consequently, by putting individuals low on the Dark Triad in a competitive 
environment, recognition programs can lead them to expect more 
counterproductive efforts from their peers. This in turn can cause them to increase 
their own counterproductive efforts due to a desire to reciprocate negative actions 
with negative actions. Negative reciprocity has been widely documented in 
experiments (e.g., Camerer and Thaler 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Sprinkle and 
Williamson 2007) as well as in field studies and surveys (e.g., Robinson and 
Bennett 1995; Uhl-Bien and Maslyn 2003). Therefore, while I expect recognition 
programs to have a relatively small effect on the counterproductive efforts of 
individuals high on the Dark Triad, I expect a bigger effect for those low on the 
Dark Triad. This prediction is broadly consistent with the results of Brown et al. 
(2013) which suggest that certain environmental factors can lead “good people” to 
do “bad things.” Therefore, I test the following hypothesis:   
  
 37 
H2: The effect of recognition programs on counterproductive efforts 
is more pronounced for individuals low on the Dark Triad than for 
individuals high on the Dark Triad.  
 
3.3 METHOD 
3.3.1 Participants and Design 
 
Seventy-six undergraduate and graduate business students participated and 
completed my experiment.  The average participant was about 21 years old, and 
approximately 47 percent of the participants were male. 
In natural settings, recognition can be conveyed to employees either 
privately or publicly. For example, organizations can recognize outstanding 
performers privately with private notes or emails or publicly by holding special 
ceremonies or publishing their achievements in company newsletters. The theories 
underlying H1 and H2 apply to both private and public recognition programs. 
Nevertheless, to ensure that results are robust to the form of recognition, I 
manipulate Recognition Program at three levels: No Recognition, Private 
Recognition, and Public Recognition. Participants in the No Recognition condition 
were not promised or provided recognition. Participants in the Private and Public 
Recognition conditions were promised and provided private or public recognition 
not tied to financial rewards.   
3.3.2 Experimental Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). 
As participants arrived, they were randomly assigned to the No Recognition 
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condition or one of the two Recognition conditions. Within each condition, the z-
Tree program randomly assigned participants to groups of three.11 Participants were 
told they would earn points working independently on an experimental task. They 
were also told that they would be paid a show-up fee of $10.00 and $0.25 for each 
point they had remaining at the end of the experiment.12 
Participants then learned whether the top performer in his/her group would 
be recognized and if so whether the recognition would be conveyed privately or 
publicly. Participants in the Private Recognition condition were told “the 
participant with the highest individual performance in each group will be notified 
and recognized privately. That is, you will be notified if you achieve the highest 
individual performance in your group by a private computer message.” Participants 
in the Public Recognition condition were told “the participant with the highest 
individual performance in each group will be notified and recognized publicly. That 
is, you will be notified if you achieve the highest individual performance in your 
group, and you will stand up to be applauded by other participants for this 
achievement.” Participants in the No Recognition condition were told “the 
                                                 
11 Participants were told that in case the number of participants in the room was not divisible by 
three, one group could have four or five participants.    
12 Participants were paid a piece-rate pay. Tafkov (2013) finds that the effect of relative performance 
information on task performance is greater under piece-rate pay than under fixed wage pay. As a 
result, a piece-rate pay scheme provides the most powerful pay structure under which to examine 
the effect of recognition programs on productive efforts and the moderating role of the Dark Triad 
of personalities. 
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participant with the highest individual performance in each group will not be 
notified or recognized.” 
Because participants are paid a piece-rate pay based on their individual 
performance, their compensation is not influenced by whether or not they receive 
recognition. There are two reasons for this design choice. First, this study is 
motivated by the observation that many organizations award employees recognition 
with minimal or no corresponding financial rewards. Although opponents argue 
that recognizing employees based on measured of relative performance can lead 
them to engage in activities intended to undermine the performance of their peers 
(Kohn 1993), no research has shown that recognition programs not associated with 
financial rewards can lead to these counterproductive behaviors. Second, although 
the psychological processes I test likely exist under recognition programs with 
financial rewards, non-financial recognitions provide the most powerful setting to 
test these processes. That is, without the influence of financial rewards that increase 
productive and counterproductive efforts in all conditions, it is easier to statistically 
detect differences caused by the theorized psychological processes.  
After participants learned about their assigned recognition condition, they 
were informed of the opportunity to undermine the performance of their group 
members by taking points away from them. I use the number of points they take 
away from their group members to capture their intended counterproductive efforts. 
In particular, participants were told “participants who worked on the experimental 
  
 40 
task in prior sessions earned on average 50 points, but individual performance 
varied greatly. Before you work on this challenging experimental task, you will be 
given the opportunity to reduce (in advance) the point total of each of your group 
members by up to 10 points.”  
All participants were clearly informed of the consequences of taking points 
away from their group members before they made the decision. Participants in the 
Recognition conditions were told “this decision reduces the points and 
compensation of your group members without increasing your own. However, it 
increases your chance of being the top performer and, thus, receiving recognition.” 
Participants in the No Recognition condition were told “this decision reduces the 
points and compensation of your group members without increasing your own. 
However, as just described, the participant with the highest individual performance 
in each group will not be notified or recognized.”  
I made two design choices related to the measure of counterproductive 
efforts. First, I do not impose a cost on counterproductive efforts. That is, 
participants’ own compensation is not affected by the number of points they take 
away from their group members. Imposing a financial cost will likely reduce 
counterproductive efforts in all conditions. Since there is no theory to predict that 
a financial cost associated with taking points away would affect participants high 
on the Dark Triad differently than those low on the Dark Triad, this design choice 
enhances power without inducing a bias.     
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Second, participants decided how many points to take away from their 
group members before they learned about the experimental task. This design choice 
ensures that participants’ performance or expected performance on the 
experimental task has no way of affecting the number of points they take from their 
group members, giving me a more powerful setting to test the effect of recognition 
programs on counterproductive efforts. In natural settings, however, employees can 
engage in counterproductive activities before, during, or after the task. To the extent 
that employees view productive and counterproductive efforts as substitutes, their 
performance on the task can affect their decision to engage in counterproductive 
activities. However, my data shows that the number of points participants take away 
from their group members is not correlated with the number of boxes they count 
correctly in the full, the high Dark Triad, or the low Dark Triad subsamples (p = 
0.94, 0.84, and 0.68, respectively, untabulated), suggesting that participants do not 
act as if taking points away and working hard on the task are substitutes. As a result, 
it is unlikely that changing the order of the productive and counterproductive 
decisions would change the pattern of my results.13 
                                                 
13 However, there still remains the possibility that participants would view the productive and 
counterproductive efforts as substitutes if they were to work on the experimental task first prior to 
making the counterproductive decision. Future research can examine this possibility and investigate 
the circumstances under which people are more likely to view productive and counterproductive 
efforts as different means to the same end.  
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After participants decided how many points to take away from each of their 
group members, they were introduced to the experimental task-a letter search task.14 
Each participant received a “Production” envelope containing 15 pages. On each 
page, there were 8 boxes of random letters. Each box had a single letter (the search 
letter) in the top right hand corner. Below the search letter was a 3-row by 18-
column block of letters. Participants were asked to determine the number of times 
the search letter appeared in the corresponding box of letters and enter the answer 
in a computer spreadsheet. They were asked to count and enter the answers for as 
many search boxes as they can in a ten-minute production period. Participants then 
practiced the task for two minutes without earning any points and worked on the 
task for ten minutes to earn points.  
After participants completed the task, they answered post experimental 
questions about the experimental task and completed a Dark Triad questionnaire. I 
measure the Dark Triad of personalities using the 12-item questionnaire developed 
and validated by Jonason and Webster (2010). Participants were asked whether they 
agree or disagree with these items using a seven-point Likert scale with “1” labeled 
“strongly disagree” and “7” labeled “strongly agree” (see Appendix A). I assign 
participants scoring at or above the median on this questionnaire to the high Dark 
Triad subsample and the remaining participants to the low Dark Triad subsample. 
                                                 
14 Variations of the letter-search task have been used in accounting studies to examine the effects 
of different management control and incentive systems on task performance (e.g., Sprinkle et al. 
2008; Webb et al. 2013; Kachelmeier et al. 2013)  
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Consequently, I expect participants in the high Dark Triad subsample to exhibit 
more Dark Triad behavioral tendencies on average than participants in the low Dark 
Triad subsample. 
After participants answered these questions, the top performer of each 
group was recognized (or not recognized) according to his/her assigned recognition 
condition. Then all participants were paid and dismissed. Table 1 summarizes the 
sequence of steps completed by participants during the experiment. The experiment 
used no deception of any kind. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for the number of boxes participants 
correctly count (productive efforts) and number of points they take away from their 
group members (counterproductive efforts) by recognition condition. In the full 
sample, based on means reported in Table 2, although recognition programs seem 
to increase both productive and counterproductive efforts, the form of recognition 
(private or public) does not seem to make a difference. To increase power, I 
combine the Private and Public Recognition conditions and compare the No 
Recognition condition to the combined Recognition condition for all main 
hypothesis tests. In supplemental analyses, I demonstrate that results are robust to 
whether recognition is provided privately or publicly.  
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Because the Dark Triad scores are collected at the end of the experiment, 
prior to testing the main hypotheses, I perform tests to ensure that these scores are 
not influenced by the experimental manipulation or decisions made by participants 
earlier in the experiment.15 First, I check to see whether the recognition 
manipulation influences how participants respond to the Dark Triad questionnaire. 
In theory, because the Dark Triad questionnaire measures stable personality traits, 
and this measure has been shown to be stable over time (Jonason and Webster 
2010), the recognition manipulation should not have affected the measure. 
Consistent with this argument, the Dark Triad scores in the No Recognition 
condition and those in the Recognition condition do not differ (p = 0.55, two-
tailed).16 As a result, the Dark Triad measure is theoretically and empirically 
independent from the recognition manipulation.17 
3.4.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 H1 examines whether and how the Dark Triad of personalities moderates 
the effect of recognition programs on productive efforts. To reduce noise, I use the 
                                                 
15 As shown in Table 1, participants complete the Dark Triad questionnaire after being introduced 
to the recognition manipulation and after they make both the counterproductive and productive 
decisions. However, they complete the questionnaire before they receive recognition and 
performance feedback.  
16 Dark Triad scores range from 1.25 to 5.83, with a mean of 3.36 and a median of 3.50. The Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality indicates that participants’ Dark Triad scores are normally distributed 
(Shapiro and Wilk 1965).  
17 In addition, the correlation between counterproductive efforts and Dark Triad scores for the full 
sample is insignificant (p = 0.48). Therefore, it is unlikely that participants’ decisions to take 
points away from their group members have influenced how they responded to the Dark Triad 
questionnaire.  
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ranked number of search boxes participants correctly count as the primary measure 
of productive efforts (Ranked Correct). I rank-order participants based on the 
number of boxes they correctly count. The participant with the lowest number 
receives the lowest rank and the participant with the highest number receives the 
highest rank. Thus, higher ranks indicate greater productive efforts. To test H1, I 
conduct an ANCOVA using Ranked Correct as the dependent variable, 
Recognition Program (No Recognition vs. Recognition) and Dark Triad (high Dark 
Triad vs. low Dark Triad) as dependent variables, and English as a covariate. I set 
English to one if a participant speaks English as his/her first language and zero 
otherwise. I use English to control for the variation in participants’ ability to quickly 
identify English alphabetic letters.  
Figure 1 presents mean Ranked Correct by condition and Table 3 presents 
the results of the ANCOVA. English has a marginally significant effect on Ranked 
Correct (t = 1.67, p = 0.10, two-tailed). Controlling for English, Recognition 
Program has a main effect on Ranked Correct (t = 1.65, p = 0.05).18  This main 
effect suggests that recognition programs motivate productive efforts on average, 
consistent with arguments made by proponents of recognition programs. However, 
this main effect is qualified by a marginally significant interaction with Dark Triad 
(t = 1.54, p = 0.06), indicating that the effect of Recognition Program on Rank 
                                                 
18 Because of the directional nature of my predictions, all reported p-values are one-tailed, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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Correct is greater for participants high on the Dark Triad than those low on the Dark 
Triad. Panel C of Table 3 reports follow-up analyses of this interaction. Recognition 
Program increases Ranked Correct within the high Dark Triad subsample (t = 2.17, 
p = 0.02), but it does not have a significant effect on Ranked Correct within the low 
Dark Triad subsample (t = 0.10, p = 0.46). Together these results suggest that 
recognition programs increase productive efforts more for individuals high on the 
Dark Triad than for individuals low on the Dark Triad, consistent with H1. 
3.4.3 Test of Hypothesis 2 
3.4.3.1 Main Analyses for Hypothesis 2  
H2 examines whether and how the Dark Triad of personalities moderates 
the effect of recognition programs on counterproductive efforts. An examination of 
the distribution of the number of points participants take away from their group 
members indicates that 87% of all participants take away either zero (45%), five 
(24%) or ten (18%) points, making the dependent variable for this analysis 
effectively a three-level categorical variable.  As ANOVA is inappropriate for 
analyzing categorical dependent variables, I estimate an ordered logistic regression 
to test H2. An ordered logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is categorical and takes on values that have a natural order (Kennedy 
2008).  
I use Points Taken as the main dependent variable. It is set to one if a 
participant takes away zero point (no point), two if a participant takes away between 
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one and nine points (some points) and three if a participant takes away the 
maximum ten points (maximum points).19 The three independent variables for the 
ordered logistic regression are: Recognition Program (No Recognition = -1 and 
Recognition =1), Dark Triad (low Dark Triad = -1 and high Dark Triad = 1), and 
Recognition Program × Dark Triad. I use effect coding for the ordered logistic 
analysis so that results can be interpreted similarly to results from an ANOVA. 
Specifically, the coefficients on Recognition Program and Dark Triad can be 
interpreted as the main effects of these variables, and the coefficient on Recognition 
Program × Dark Triad can be interpreted as the interaction effect.  
Figure 2 presents the raw number of points taken by condition and Table 4 
presents the results of the ordered logistic regression. As reported in Panel B of 
Table 4, the coefficient on Recognition Program is positive and significant (z = 
2.45, p < 0.01), suggesting that recognition programs increase the likelihood of 
higher levels of counterproductive efforts, consistent with arguments made by 
opponents of recognition programs. More importantly, the coefficient on 
Recognition Program × Dark Triad is marginally significant (z = 1.59, p = 0.06), 
providing some evidence that the effect of recognition programs on 
counterproductive efforts is greater for participants low on the Dark Triad than for 
those high on the Dark Triad. Panel C Table 4 reports results of separate ordinal 
                                                 
19 Keeping Points Taken at 11 levels (between zero and ten) or dropping participants who take away 
neither zero, five or ten points provides qualitatively similar results.  
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logistic regressions for the high and low Dark Triad subsamples. For the low Dark 
Triad subsample, Recognition Program is positively associated with higher values 
of Points Taken (z = 2.81, p < 0.01). However, for the high Dark Triad subsample, 
this relation is insignificant (z = 0.62, p = 0.27). These results provide some initial 
evidence suggesting that in response to a recognition program, individuals low on 
the Dark Triad are more likely to increase their counterproductive efforts than 
individuals high on the Dark Triad, consistent with H2.   
3.4.3.2 Additional analyses for Hypothesis 2 
In addition, I test whether recognition programs lead people to expect more 
counterproductive efforts from their team members, and whether this effect is more 
pronounced for those low on the Dark Triad than those high on the Dark Triad as 
predicted by my theories. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agree with the following statement in the post experimental questionnaire, “I think 
my group members took many points away from me on the letter-search task” on a 
seven-point Likert scale (Others Took Points). As expected, Others Took Points is 
positively correlated with Points Taken in both the high and low Dark Triad 
subsamples (p < 0.01, untabulated), suggesting that the more counterproductive 
efforts people expect from others the more they engage in counterproductive efforts 
themselves regardless of their level of Dark Triad personality traits.  
I then estimate an ordered logistic regression using Others Took Points as 
the dependent variable and Recognition Program, Dark Triad, and Recognition 
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Program × Dark Triad as independent variables. Table 5 presents the results. As 
expected, the Recognition Program × Dark Triad interaction is significant (z = 1.62, 
p = 0.05) suggesting that the effect of recognition programs on expected 
counterproductive efforts from others is greater for participants low on the Dark 
Triad than those high on the Dark Triad. In addition, Recognition Program is 
positively associated with Others Took Points for the low Dark Triad subsample (z 
= 2.69, p < 0.01) and not associated with Others Took Points for the high Dark 
Triad subsample (z = -0.65, p = 0.74). Together, results presented in Tables 4 and 
5 provide evidence consistent with the prediction that individuals low on the Dark 
Triad are relatively more likely to expect more counterproductive efforts from 
others when a recognition program is provided. As a result, they are more likely to 
increase their own counterproductive efforts in response to a recognition program 
than those high on the Dark Triad.  
3.4.4 Supplemental Analyses 
3.4.4.1 Private vs. Public Recognition Programs 
So far, I have presented theories and evidence consistent with (1) the 
productive effect of recognition programs is more pronounced for individuals high 
on the Dark Triad than for individuals low on the Dark Triad; and (2) the 
counterproductive effect of recognition programs is more pronounced for 
individuals low on the Dark Triad than for individuals high on the Dark Triad. Next, 
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I provide evidence suggesting that these effects are robust to whether recognition 
is provided privately or publicly.  
More specifically, no difference in Ranked Correct is observed between the 
Private and Public recognition conditions in the full, high Dark Triad, or low Dark 
Triad sample (p = 0.74, 0.70 and 0.78, respectively, two-tailed, untabulated). In 
addition, compared to no recognition program, both the private and public 
recognition programs improve productive efforts for the high Dark Triad subsample 
(p = 0.02 and 0.07, respectively for private and public recognition, untabulated), 
and neither program increases productive efforts for the low Dark Triad subsample 
(p = 0.45, for either private or public recognition, untabulated). 20 
 Finally, no difference in Points Taken is observed between the Private and 
Public Recognition conditions in the full, high Dark Triad, or low Dark Triad 
sample (p = 0.69, 0.53 and 0.94, respectively, two-tailed, untabulated).  In addition, 
compared to no recognition program, both the private and public recognition 
programs increase counterproductive efforts for the low Dark Triad subsample (p 
                                                 
20 These results are somewhat inconsistent with prior studies that find a positive incremental 
performance effect of public over private relative performance information (e.g., Tafkov, 2013).  
There are two potential explanations for this inconsistency, both of which represent future research 
opportunities. First, prior research examines the effect of public vs. private relative performance in 
an environment where it is not possible to engage in counterproductive behaviors.  It is possible that 
participants in my experiment are reluctant to be recognized publicly when recognition is also a 
function of counterproductive efforts.  Second, the relative performance information in prior 
research includes both positive and negative information, while only positive performance is 
recognized in my study.  It is possible that the positive incremental effect of public relative 
performance information in prior studies is driven by the public disclosure of negative relative 
performance information.  
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< 0.01 for either private or public recognition, untabulated), and neither program 
significantly increases counterproductive efforts for the high Dark Triad subsample 
(p = 0.22 and 0.42, respectively for private and public recognition, untabulated). 
These analyses suggest that results supporting H1 and H2 are robust to whether 
recognition is provided privately or publicly.  
3.4.4.2 Recognition Programs and Task Enjoyment 
I also examine the effect of recognition programs on the extent to which 
participants enjoy the experimental task. A measure of task enjoyment provides a 
wholistic representation of participants’ overall experience, which is influenced by 
both their productive and counterproductive efforts. In the post experimental 
questionnaire, participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with 
the following statement, “I enjoyed working on the letter-search task” on a seven-
point Likert scale (Task Enjoyment). I estimate an ordered logistic regression with 
Task Enjoyment as the dependent variable, and Recognition Program, Dark Triad, 
and Recognition Program × Dark Triad as independent variables.  
Figure 3 shows mean Task Enjoyment by condition. Table 6 presents the 
results. The coefficient on Recognition × Dark Triad is significant (z = 2.22, p = 
0.03, two-tailed) indicating that the effect of Recognition Program on Task 
Enjoyment is different for individuals high and low on the Dark Triad. While the 
effect of Recognition Program on Task Enjoyment is positive and marginally 
significant for participants high on the Dark Triad (z = 1.62, p = 0.11, two-tailed), 
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it is negative and marginally significant for those low on the Dark Triad (z = 1.53, 
p = 0.13, two-tailed).  
These results are interesting and relevant for two reasons. First, they provide 
additional evidence suggesting that people high and low on the Dark Triad do 
experience the same recognition program in markedly different ways. While 
recognition programs make the task more exciting and enjoyable for individuals 
high on the Dark Triad, they make the task less enjoyable for individuals low on 
the Dark Triad. These results are consistent with the finding that recognition 
programs primarily increase productive efforts for individuals high on the Dark 
Triad and counterproductive efforts for those low on the Dark Triad. Second, to the 
extent that Task Enjoyment measures participants’ intrinsic motivation, these 
results provide some contradictory evidence to the widely held view that external 
rewards such as recognition programs undermine intrinsic motivation (e.g., Lepper, 
Greene, and Nisbett 1973; Deci and Ryan 1985).21 My results suggest that the 
relation between external rewards and intrinsic motivation might be more nuanced 
than previously understood. Future research can provide insights into how 
persistent individual characteristics moderate the relation between external rewards 
(both financial and non-financial) and intrinsic motivation.  
                                                 
21 Intrinsic motivation reflects the propensity to engage in activities that are inherently satisfactory 
and enjoyable. It not only has implications for short-term performance, it also encourages learning 
and plays an important role in sustaining long-run performance (Ryan and Deci 2000). One 
standard measure of intrinsic motivation is self-reported task enjoyment (Deci et al. 1999).   
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this study, I examine the productive and counterproductive effects of 
programs that award employees nonpecuniary recognition based on measures of 
relative performance. I find that although these programs increase both productive 
and counterproductive efforts in the aggregate, the Dark Triad of personalities 
moderates these effects. More specifically, providing a recognition program to 
individuals high on the Dark Triad primarily motivates productive efforts. In stark 
contrast, providing a recognition program to individuals low on the Dark Triad 
primarily motivates counterproductive efforts.  
In addition to contributing to the literature in accounting that studies the 
effect of relative performance information on employee performance, results of this 
study have important implications for the use of recognition programs in practice. 
These programs have been a subject of heated debated in the practitioner literature. 
Proponents argue that these programs motivate productive efforts at a minimal cost 
(Luthans 2000). Opponents counter that these programs encourage 
counterproductive behaviors, and that the cost of these behaviors outweigh the 
programs’ benefits (Kohn 1993). My results help reconcile these opposing views 
by highlighting that, although recognition programs have both a productive and a 
counterproductive effect at the aggregate level, for some individuals the productive 
effect dominates while for others the counterproductive effect dominates. Because 
prior research suggests that certain jobs attract employees high on the Dark Triad, 
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my results highlight the importance for managerial accountants to consider the 
unique characteristics of their workforce in determining whether to provide 
recognition based on measures of relative performance.  
More broadly, the results of my study highlight the importance of 
considering individual employee characteristics when designing and implementing 
management control and incentive systems. These results provide a clear example 
of how an incentive mechanism that motivates productivity in some employees can 
at the same time induce detrimental behaviors in others. Here, managerial 
accounting researchers can leverage theories developed in personality psychology 
and provide important insights. More specifically, managerial accounting 
researchers can identify important individual characteristics that interact with key 
elements of management control and incentive systems in affecting employee 
motivation and behaviors. 
Limitations of my study provide additional opportunities for future 
research. First, the recognition programs in my experiment are non-recurring. A 
distinguishing feature of a recurring recognition program is that the performance 
feedback provided by past recognitions can potentially interact with the effect of 
future recognition opportunities. Although my results provide a meaningful starting 
point to understand the effects of recurring recognition programs, how performance 
feedback affects productive and counterproductive efforts is out of the scope of the 
current investigation. It is possible that individuals high and low on the Dark Triad 
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may respond to performance feedback differently. Dworkis (2013) provides theory 
suggesting that individuals high in Narcissism respond to positive performance 
feedback more positively and negative feedback more negatively than individuals 
low in Narcissism. If so, in future studies, it would be interesting to understand how 
performance feedback generated by past recognitions interacts with future 
recognition opportunities and employee specific characteristics to impact the 
effectiveness of recurring recognition programs.  
Second, participants in my experiment are randomly assigned into groups 
and they do not know the identity of their group members. In organizations, social 
ties exist among employees. How pre-existing social ties affect the efficacy of 
recognition programs and how these programs, in turn, shape these social ties are 
interesting and important research questions for future investigation.    
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
TABLE 1
Sequence of Steps for Participants during the Experiment 
Participants decide in advance how many points to take away from each of their group members.
Participants learn about the number of points they have remaining after points taken away by their 
group members have been deducted and are paid 0.25 for each point plus a $10 show-up fee in cash.
Participants read that they will earn points working on a challenging task and will be paid a show-up 
fee of $10 and $0.25 per point they have at the end of the experiment. 
Participants read about their assigned recognition condition.
Participants learn about the letter-search task and work on the task for ten minutes.
Participants complete a post experimental questionaire which among other things includes the Dark 
Triad questionnaire. 
The top performer of each group in the Recognition condition is recognized. 
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No Rec. Private Rec. Public Rec. No Rec. Private Rec. Public Rec. No Rec. Private Rec. Public Rec.
Num of Correct Boxes
c
42.92         46.88         47.00         40.73         49.69         48.00         44.64         42.40         46.08         
(13.67) (10.54) (14.66) (9.74) (11.29) (10.95) (16.27) (7.75) (17.84)
Num of Points Deducted
d
1.96           4.46           4.08           3.27           4.44           4.00           0.93           4.50           4.15           
(3.47) (3.76) (3.92) (4.56) (3.92) (4.16) (1.90) (3.69) (3.85)
N 25 26 25 11 16 12 14 10 13
a
b
c
d
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics by Recognition Program
Full Sample High DT Subsample
b
Low DT Subsample
b
Recognition Program
a
Recognition Program
a
Recognition Program
a
The number of search boxes participants count correctly.
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No 
Recognition condition are not promised or porvided recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided non-
pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above the median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the high Dark Triad subsample and the remaining participants are 
assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
The number of points participants take away from each group member. 
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Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) for Ranked Correct
c
No Rec.
a
Rec.
a 
High DT Subsample
b 
30.45 46.13
(21.00) (20.74)
Low DT Subsample
b
35.00 35.20
(24.33) (21.37)
Panel B: Analysis of Variance
Factors df MSE t p-value
e
English
d
1 1275.72 1.67 0.10
Dark Triad (DT) 1 71.53 0.40 0.69
Recognition Program (RP) 1 1239.51 1.65 0.05
DT x RP 1 1083.19 1.54 0.06
Error 71 457.59
Panel C: Simple Effects of Recognition Program on Ranked Correct
df MSE t p-value
e
within  High DT Subsample 1 2067.92 2.17 0.02
within  Low DT Subsample1 5.96 0.10 0.46
a
b
c
d
e
Participants scoring at or above the median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the high 
Dark Triad subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Ranked Correct represents the ordinal rank of the number of search boxes participants correctly 
counted. A larger number indicates greater producitive efforts. 
Reported significance tests for directional predictions are one-tailed and are indicated by bold face.
TABLE 3
ANOVA Analaysis of the Effects of Recogntion Program and Dark Triad on the Ranked 
Number of Boxes Participants Correctly Count
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided 
non-pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
English is set to one if a participant's first language is English and zero otherwise.
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Panel A: Frequency Distribution for Points Taken
c
No Rec.
a
Rec.
a 
High DT Subsample
b 
No Point 55% 36%
Some Points 18% 43%
Maximum Points27% 21%
Low DT Subsample
b
No Point 79% 30%
Some Points 21% 48%
Maximum Points0% 22%
Panel B: Results of Ordered Logistic Analysis - Full Sample
Independent Variables Estimate z p-value
e
Dark Triad (DT) 0.33 1.31 0.19
Recognition Program (RP) 0.63 2.45 <0.01
DT x RP 0.40 1.59 0.06
Panel C: Results of Orderd Logistic Analysis - Subsamples
Independent Variables Estimate z p-value
e
High DT Subsample 
        Recogntion Program (RP) 0.42 0.62 0.27
Low DT Subsample
        Recognition Program (RP) 2.22 2.80 <0.01
a
b
c
e Reported significance tests for directional predictions are one-tailed and are indicated by bold face.
TABLE 4
Ordered Logistic Analsyis of the Effects of Recognition Program and Dark Triad on 
Whether Participants Take Away No Point, Some Points, or the Maximum Ten Points
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided 
non-pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above the median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the high 
Dark Triad subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Points Taken is a categorical variable set to "No Point", "Some Points" and "Maximum Points" if a 
participant takes zero, between one and nine, and all ten points away from each of his/her team 
members, respectively. 
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Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) for Others Took Points
c
No Rec.
a
Rec.
a 
High DT Subsample
b 
4.91 4.74
(1.20) (1.56)
Low DT Subsample
b
3.64 4.64
(1.95) (2.25)
Panel B: Results of Ordered Logistic Analysis - Full Sample
Independent Variables Estimate z p-value
e
Dark Triad (DT) 0.30 1.35 0.18
Recognition Program (RP) 0.33 1.50 0.07
DT x RP 0.40 1.62 0.05
Panel C: Results of Orderd Logistic Analsis - Subsamples
Independent Variables Estimate z p-value
e
High DT Subsample 
        Recogntion Program (RP) -0.48 -0.65 0.74
Low DT Subsample
        Recognition Program (RP) 1.59 2.69 <0.01
a
b
c
e Reported significance tests for directional predictions are one-tailed and are indicated by bold face.
TABLE 5
Ordered Logistic Analsyis of the Effects of Recognition Program and Dark Triad on 
Expected Points Taken by Others 
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided 
non-pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above the median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the high 
Dark Triad subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Others Took Points measures expected counterproducitive efforts from others. It represents 
participant's response to the following statement, " I think my group members took many points away 
from me on the letter-search task," using a seven-point Likert scale. 
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Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) for Enjoyment
c
No Rec.
a
Rec.
a 
High DT Subsample
b 
5.45 6.11
(1.29) (1.07)
Low DT Subsample
b
5.79 5.17
(1.25) (1.37)
Panel B: Results of Ordered Logistic Analysis - Full Sample
Independent Variables Estimate p-value
e
Dark Triad (DT) -0.20 1.42 0.40
Recognition Program (RP) -0.07 0.84 0.16
DT x RP 0.51 2.22 0.03
Panel C: Results of Orderd Logistic Analsis - Subsamples
Independent Variables Estimate p-value
e
High DT Subsample 
        Recogntion Program (RP) 1.07 1.62 0.11
Low DT Subsample
        Recognition Program (RP) -0.97 1.53 0.13
a
b
c
e Reported significance tests are twp-tailed as no directional predictions are made.
TABLE 6
Ordered Logistic Analsyis of the Effects of Recognition Program and Dark Triad on Task 
Enjoyment
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided 
non-pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the High 
Dark Triad subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Enjoyment represents participants' response to the following statement, " I enjoyed working on the 
letter search task," using a seven-point Likert scale. 
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a
b
c
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided non-
pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above the median on the Dark Triad questionnaire are assigned to the high Dark 
Triad subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Ranked Correct represents the ordinal rank of the number of search boxes participants correctly counted. A 
larger number indicates greater producitive efforts. 
Figure 1
The Effects of Recogntion Program
a
 and Dark Triad
b
 on the Ranked Number of Boxes 
Participants Correctly Count
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a
b
c
Figure 2
 The Effects of Recognition Program
a
 and Dark Triad
b
 on the Number of Points Participants Take 
Away from Each Group Member
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided non-
pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above median on the Dark Triad questionnaire is assigned to the high Dark Triad 
subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
The number of points participants take away from each group member. 
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a
b
c
Figure 3
The Effects of Recognition Program
a
 and Dark Triad
b
 on Task Enjoyment
c
Recognition Program is manipulated at three levels: No Recognition, Private Recognition, and Public 
Recognition. Specifically, Participants in the No Recognition condition are not promised or porvided 
recognition. Participants in the Private and Public Recognition conditions are promised and provided non-
pecuniary private or public recognition, respectively, for superiror performance. 
Participants scoring at or above median on the Dark Triad questionnaire is assigned to the high Dark Triad 
subsample and the remaining participants are assigned to the low Dark Triad subsample.
Enjoyment represents participants' response to the following statement, " I enjoyed working on the letter 
search task," using a seven-point Likert scale. 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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Screen 26B – non-top performer
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Manipulated Text for the Private Recognition Condition 
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1 .                             H   
O H P S Y F N P Z A P A B D N D K J 
M Q I D W K I A I T T G U H Q C G J 
O N B J C D N G N Q A S E B E R E L 
                                    
2 .                             C   
F D D G K H V E J I I N D T S U G S 
B E U Y S K G N X H I N T D Z A J J 
A A I W V E R X P P M Q U C E N I P 
                                    
3 .                             V   
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4 .                             Y   
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5 .                             T   
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6 .                             V   
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7 .                             T   
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8 .                             F   
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Scenarios  
 
The scenarios in this section are independent of each other and are independent of 
the experimental task you just performed. Please answer the questions in each 
scenario based on only the information provided in each scenario.  
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